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ABSTRACT 
This study presents an analysis of Ghana’s performance in export of cocoa using the revealed 
comparative advantage and revealed symmetric comparative advantage measures of competitiveness 
for the periods 1964-69 (immediate years following the collapse of world price of cocoa), 1983-92 
(Reform and Adjustment Period) and 2000-2010 (recent decade). In addition, the magnitude and 
effects of key economic determinants of cocoa exports, production and farm gate price for Ghana are 
estimated. RCA and RSCA figures computed in the current study show that Ghana has comparative 
advantage in export of both raw and processed cocoa, with its advantage being higher in exports of the 
raw product. Ghana’s performance in export of cocoa has improved significantly since 1983. This 
observation is attributed to initiation of the Economic Recovery Program in 1983(which created the 
right conditions for agricultural investment and helped address inefficiencies in marketing and fiscal 
disciplines), the Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) between 1987 and 1990 (which 
helped in strengthening the capacity of agricultural research, extension and policy planning), opening 
up of the domestic market to competition through partial liberalization of internal marketing from the 
early 1990s, establishment of a price stabilization system and continuous government support to the 
sector through increased public spending on infrastructure and productivity-enhancing innovations.  
 
Improvement in the export performance, anticipated increases in global demand and world price of 
cocoa, wide yield gap of Ghana, positive attitude of farmers towards supply of cocoa due to increased 
government support, and intensification of competition on the domestic market indicate potential for 
further improvement in Ghana’s production and export of cocoa. However, upon estimates obtained in 
the current study, to realize any further improvement in the performance of the cocoa subsector, 
measures should be put in place to bridge the wide yield gap, ensure continuous government support 
to various stakeholders in the supply chain, and tighten the loose border between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire to help minimize smuggling in times of increasing farm gate price of cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
Keywords: Competitiveness, cocoa exports, value addition, determinants, government support, price 
stabilization, world price of cocoa, producer price of cocoa, cocoa production 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Holding firmly unto, developing and sustaining subsectors on which a country’s agriculture strongly 
depends have been the actions reflected by various regimes in most developing countries worldwide. 
Such actions are reflected in pursuit of enhancing food security, reducing poverty and earning foreign 
exchange through exports (as against draining of it through imports). A very important subsector (and 
commodity) that holds much respect in this regard in Ghana is cocoa. Dramatic changes undergone by 
the cocoa sub-sector prior to initiation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and thereafter, have 
been the primary reasons underlying the declines and improvements observed in Ghana’s agriculture 
sector for the past five decades. By virtue of its immense contribution to the agriculture sector and the 
economy as a whole, cocoa has been described as the backbone of Ghana’s economy (Osei, 2007), 
with Lundstedt and Pärssinen (2009) topping it up with the title “Cocoa is Ghana, Ghana is cocoa”.   
 
Cocoa is a major contributor to Ghana’s gross domestic product (GDP), accounts for approximately 
23% of foreign exchange earnings (ICCO, 2012) and is a major source of income to over 800,000 
farmers and many others engaged  in trade, transportation and processing of cocoa (World Bank, 
2011). Beyond its narrow role in Ghana, cocoa provides livelihoods for millions of smallholder 
farmers in over 50 countries across Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia (Kaplinsky, 2004; 
World Bank, 2011). Upon the unique position it holds in the economy of Ghana, several policy 
measures have been devised and implemented towards developing and ensuring continuous 
contribution of the cocoa subsector to national development. Such measures are devised, amidst 
pressing constraints (like production risk, market risk, enabling environment risk and vulnerability 
risks) to help restructure the industry, improve productivity and reduce inefficiencies in marketing. 
Addressing of these dimensions is purported on improving the country’s export potential, improving 
the competitiveness of the sub-sector and improving standards of living for the various stakeholders 
within the supply chain. 
 
In pursuit of improving the country’s potential and competitiveness in export of cocoa, farmers are 
presently incentivized through increased share in export price (net f.o.b. price) among other bonuses, 
and measures are in place to help achieve the country’s medium term objective of processing at least 
40% of  cocoa output locally (thus increasing value addition). Besides increasing value addition in its 
cocoa exports, the Government of Ghana (GoG) hopes to maintain its reputable position on the world 
cocoa beans market with the remaining 60% through increased volumes of production and export. To 
achieve these goals amidst anticipated increases in supply-side competition, there arises a need to 
analyze past and current competitiveness of the cocoa sub-sector and to identify and assess the 
magnitude and effects of drivers for the major strongholds of the subsector namely cocoa beans 
export, cocoa beans production and domestic producer price for cocoa. Identification of the magnitude 
and effects of such drivers would help optimize benefits from current boosters and mitigate adverse 
influences from inhibitors. Analysis of the competitiveness of the sub-sector would help provide 
information on the performance of Ghana in export of cocoa beans and processed cocoa products. 
Findings from the current study could be useful to policy makers, farmers, prospective investors and 
for agribusiness planning. 
 
 
 
1.1 EVOLUTION OF GHANA’S ECONOMY, COCOA POLICY AND ASSISTANCE 
 
Cocoa has historically been regarded a key economic sector and a major source of export and fiscal 
earnings (McKay and Arytee, 2005). Prior to independence, emphasis was placed on the production of 
cocoa among other industrial crops (like coffee and oil palm) for export at the expense of staple food 
crops for domestic consumption. By virtue of the immense contribution of the cocoa subsector during 
that period to the Ghanaian economy through foreign exchange earnings, Cocoa Marketing Board 
(CMB), an important institution of the colonial government was established and made a monopoly 
buyer of cocoa at fixed price paid to producers. Majority of the profits from trading in cocoa was 
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absorbed by reserves of the board until 1951, where taxes were raised and cocoa profits diverted to 
general public investment (Brooks et al, 2007). 
 
Having inherited fortunes from the pre-independence era, the government sought to industrialize the 
economy post-independence period between 1957 and 1983. This vision was however, undermined by 
political instability, ideological splits and policy reversals. The government during this period, 
specifically in early post-independence period, invested heavily in the cocoa sub-sector even when 
revenues were lower (due to declines observed in cocoa prices after 1957). It became much involved 
in central planning from 1961, rather than limiting spending on public goods. Along with expansion in 
output came increasing cost of marketing and further declines in government revenues. In addition to 
these, rising imports for public investment led to deterioration of the currency and shrinkage of foreign 
exchange reserves. In response to these, foreign exchange controls and import licensing were 
introduced and from 1961, public spending by the government was shifted away from the provision of 
public goods towards the development of large state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) designed to substitute 
domestic production for imports (Brooks et al, 2007). 
 
The collapse of world cocoa prices in the late 1964 prompted the government to print money into the 
system to help meet expenses, fuelling inflation in the process and lowering real wages. This gradually 
led to dissolution of the Ghanaian economy. The falling of cocoa prices and overvaluation of the cedi 
led to tightening of the struggle over cocoa revenue between farmers and the government. The 
situation was worsened  by the rising costs of the CMB and the smuggling of cocoa to neighboring 
countries, most notably Côte d’Ivoire where producer prices were much higher at the black market 
exchange rate (Stryker, 1990). These observations led to a steady deterioration of the economy and 
widespread rent-seeking, which increasingly undermined Ghanaian institutions and the society. Ghana 
by the early 1980s lost its stand as one of the highest per capita income countries, government 
revenues fell from 15% of GDP in the early 1970s to 6% in 1982, public sector wages fell by an 
average of 10% in real terms per year between 1975 and 1983, export earnings fell to a low of 7% of 
GDP, and external financing dried up (Brooks et al, 2007). 
 
In addressing the situation the country had found itself in, the government under the auspices of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in April 1983, initiated the Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP) as a measure to stabilize the economy and reform the market. The reform 
was focused on realigning relative prices, removing direct controls and interventions, and restoring 
fiscal discipline among other issues. Initiation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) according to 
Brooks et al (2007) led to increased inflows of external financing and annual increase of 4% in real 
GDP between 1983 and 1992. In addition, the ERP contributed immensely towards improving the 
exchange rate policy. The formulation of appropriate fiscal policies under the ERP helped balance 
national budget, lower government’s financing needs and brought inflation under control ( from 123% 
in 1983 to 10% in 1992) (Brooks et al, 2007). The stability achieved in fiscal and monetary disciplines 
were however tested in the run-up elections in 1992. In the post reform period (from 1992), emphasis 
has been placed on reforming the cocoa sector, divesting state-owned-enterprises, and establishing 
effective tax collection and expenditure systems for the government (Leith and Söderling, 2000). 
Export growth during this period has been stimulated through depreciation in real exchange rate 
resulting from the use of market-determined exchange rate and a weakening fiscal position.  
 
The sources of taxation for cocoa have historically been direct export tax, farm taxation and exchange 
rate overvaluation. Farm taxation has however fallen markedly in recent years from over 80% in the 
late 1970s to approximately 13% in 2005, increasing thereafter to about 46% in 2009 (Anderson and 
Nelgen, 2012). The relative decrease in farm taxation over that for the 1970s implies an increase in the 
share of export price received by farmers. Raising this share has been the goal of the Government of 
Ghana (GoG) and the Cocoa Board. The share of farmers in export price (net f.o.b. price) was 
approximately 70% in 2007. The increase of farmers’ share in the export price is one of reasons 
underlying current surges in cocoa output in the country. In addition to this price incentive, bonus 
payments to farmers (in cash and in kind) have also increased. The major source of government 
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revenue from the cocoa sub-sector currently is export tax and to a lesser extent on taxation of farmers. 
The tax rate on export is determined annually, and the rate for the year 2007/2008 was 11.1% of the 
f.o.b. price (Sharma and Morrison, 2011), up from 5% in 2005 (BoG, 2007). Revenue derived from 
the tax is used to finance COCOBOD’s activities. Import tariff of 20% is currently applied on 
imported cocoa products. This is to help stimulate value addition in the country’s cocoa exports and 
domestic sales through processing of at least 40% of cocoa output locally (GoG’s medium-term 
objective)  
 
Figure 1.0 Nominal Rate of Assistance 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from Anderson and Nelgen (2012) 
 
 
1.2 THE ROLE OF COCOA IN GHANA’S ECONOMY 
Cocoa has long played a vital role in Ghana’s economic development and remains an important source 
of employment to most folks in the rural community. It is a major source of income for over 800,000 
farmers and many others engaged in trade, transportation and processing of cocoa (World Bank, 
2011). In addition, cocoa remains the country’s most important agricultural export crop, accounting 
for approximately 23% of total export earnings of the country (ICCO 2012) and 11% of agricultural 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (a decrease from 34% in 1964 based on FAO data). The importance of 
the cocoa subsector to poverty reduction in the country cannot be overstated. The national poverty rate 
of Ghana according to Coulombe and Wodon (2007) fell from 51.7% in 1991/1992 and 39.5% in 
1998/1999 to 28.5% in 2005/2006. Poverty among cocoa farmers is reported to have declined 
significantly, with cocoa growth being more pro-poor than growth in other sectors. While the poverty 
rate among cocoa farmers stood at 60.1% in 1991/1992, it declined significantly to 23.9% in 
2005/2006, representing 112,000 cocoa-farming households in absolute terms. In addition to these, 
cocoa contributed to 28% of agricultural growth in 2006, up from 19% in 2001 World Bank (2007a). 
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Table 1.0     The role of cocoa in past poverty reduction 
 1991/92 1998/99 2005/06 
Total Population 
Poverty rate 
Poverty gap 
 
51.7 
18.5 
 
39.5 
13.9 
 
28.5 
9.6 
Cocoa producers 
Poverty rate 
Poverty gap 
 
60.1 
23.3 
 
36.7 
9.4 
 
23.9 
6.0 
Source: Coloumbe and Wodon, 2007 
Table 2.0     Cocoa derived export earnings as percentage of total exports (by value) 
Year Share in foreign exchange earnings 
2002 25.08% 
2003 33.98% 
2004 55.17% 
2005 32.58% 
2006 33.72% 
2007 25.00% 
2008 19.77% 
2009 23.06% 
Source: ICCO, 2012 
Figure 2.0   Contribution of cocoa to agricultural GDP 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from FAOSTAT 
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1.3 CONSTRAINTS TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCOA SUB-SECTOR 
In spite of the recent improvements observed in Ghana’s cocoa production and exports after its 
collapse in the pre-ERP era, several inhibitions have been identified by various researchers. In its 
supply chain risk assessment (SCRA) report to the COCOBOD, World Bank (2011) identified a 
number of risks that threaten to derail the subsector’s recovery. These include production risks 
(disease, pests attack, bush fires, cocoa acreage loss), market risks (cocoa price volatility, exchange 
rate volatility, interest rate volatility, input price volatility, Counterparty risks), enabling environment 
risks (cocoa smuggling due to price differential between Ghana and its neighboring cocoa producers 
notably Côte d’Ivoire, market regulation risks, policy risks, logistics breakdown, misappropriation of 
funds) and Vulnerability risk. Among these, the World Bank identified diseases (black pod disease and 
swollen shoot), pests attack (Mirids/capsids), cocoa price volatility and smuggling as the major risks 
that pose greatest threat to Ghana’s cocoa subsector. 
 
Black pod disease is considered the most pervasive and costly to farmers. Regardless of current 
control measures put in place, the average estimated value of annual crop losses stemming from black 
pod disease according to the World Bank (2011) was more than US$ 300 million during the period 
2008-2010. Within the aforementioned period, outbreaks of swollen shoot is reported to have affected 
more than 100,000 hectares across Ghana’s cocoa production belt, resulting in a first-year cumulative 
loss of an estimated US$84.9 million. Pests’ attack, notably capsids attack, identified second only to 
black pod resulted in crop losses estimated at approximately US$172 million. Putting such attacks 
under control has been the focus of COCOBOD’s mass spraying program. Amidst the numerous 
market risks in cocoa marketing, high volatility of cocoa prices on the open market has been identified 
as a persistent challenge that exposes COCOBOD to a number of related risks, most notably, 
smuggling. Smuggling of cocoa through the loose borders of the country is reported to have led to an 
estimated US$158.9 million financial loss to the Government of Ghana (GoG) and other stakeholders 
in the supply chain. 
 
Beside these supply chain related risks, the cocoa subsector is hindered by low yields. Yields of cocoa 
in Ghana are well below international averages (37% below that of neighboring Côte d’Ivoire). The 
low yields of cocoa trees in the country is attributed among others to absence of widespread row 
planting, aging trees, pest and disease attacks, inadequate fertilizer application and constraints on other 
inputs. With a climatic potential yield of 1.0 Mt/ha (MoFA, 2011), an average yield of approximately 
0.4 Mt/ha is observed in Ghana, leaving a gap of 60%. This gap, coupled with anticipated increases in 
World price of agricultural export goods over the next decade (IMF 2007; World Bank 2007) suggest 
potential for productivity-driven growth and increased competitiveness. 
 
Figure 3.0 Cocoa Planning of Ghana: Yield Gap 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from FAOSTAT and MoFA (2011) 
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1.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMESTIC SUPPLY INDICATORS 
With improvements having been observed in cocoa output in recent years, the sustainability of cocoa 
growth in Ghana is in doubt due to the gradual exhaustion of land suitable for cocoa production in the 
Western, Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Eastern, Central and Volta regions of the country. Increases observed 
in output have been driven by land expansion and increased use of labor as against improvements in 
yield. A comparison of land currently devoted to cocoa production and land suitable for cocoa 
production by Breisinger et al (2008) shows that future growth in production through area expansion 
will be limited. The very suitable land for cocoa production is gradually being exhausted and the 
virgin lands of the three northern regions where cocoa is yet to be grown are not suitable for cocoa 
production. By figures of the FAO, area harvested of cocoa increased from 693,249 hectares for the 
year 1990 to 1,650,000 hectares in the year 2011. This represents an increase of 138% in area 
harvested. Output of cocoa between the two aforementioned years increased by 138.62%, 293,355 
tonnes for the year 1990 and 700,000 tonnes in the year 2011. Contrary to these significant 
improvements in area harvested and output, yield of cocoa has more or less stagnated between the two 
years. An average yield of 0.421 was observed in the year 1990, with 0.424 been observed in the year 
2011. This represents an increase of 0.71%, which is relatively quite low. In spite of the stagnation in 
yield between the two years however, current yield is an improvement over yields for the early years 
between 2000 and 2011. 
 
Figure 4.0 Trends in cocoa production, harvested area and yield 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from FAOSTAT 
 
1.5 DEVELOPMENTS IN COCOA EXPORTS AND VALUE ADDITION 
Cocoa export of Ghana is made up of six products classified into raw, semi-processed and processed 
products. Ghana exports cocoa beans, cocoa butter, cocoa powder, cocoa paste and cocoa husks 
(shells), with export of the latter commencing in the year 1986. In spite of efforts by the government to 
increase value added in its export of cocoa, less than 20% of cocoa exports for the period 1961-2010 
were processed. This implies that, at least 80% of all cocoa exports of the country are in the raw form. 
The highest achievement in value addition (percentage-wise) so far was in the year 1997, where 
19.82% of all cocoa exports were processed. Export of cocoa butter increased from 17,432 tonnes for 
the year 1970 to 23,026 tonnes in 2010. In monetary terms, the value of exports of cocoa butter 
increased from $26,707(“000”) for the year 1970 to $86,459 (“000”) in the year 2010. Likewise, the 
volume of export for cocoa paste increased from 1,128tonnes to 2,920 tonnes between the two 
aforementioned years, with value increasing as well from $1,026 (“000”) to $11,763 (“000”). 
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Cocoa beans            Cocoa butter              Cocoa powder               Cocoa paste        Cocoa husks; shells 
Exports of cocoa powder decreased from 16,358 tonnes for the year 1970 to 8,782 tonnes in 2010. 
However, its value increased from $2,795 (“000”) for the year 1970 to $21,219 (“000”) in the year 
2010. Exports of cocoa husks from Ghana commenced in the year 1986 with 8,000 tonnes at an 
estimated value of $3000 (“000”). By the year 2010, it had reached 13,240 tonnes with a value of 
$3,322 (“000”). Export of cocoa beans decreased from 367,362 tonnes for the year 1970 to 281,437 
tonnes for the year 2010. It however, increased in monetary terms from $294,390 (“000”) for the year 
1970 to $847,395 (“000”) in 2010. Variations are however observed in quoting of these figures due to 
differences in export volumes and values reported by the various research and data management 
bodies. Based on figures from the agricultural production database of the FAO (FAOSTAT), 
approximately 13% of all cocoa exports in the year 2010 were processed. 
 
Table 3.0 Value addition in cocoa exports of Ghana 
Year Total cocoa exports 
($1000) 
Value of cocoa 
beans exports 
($1000) 
Value of processed 
cocoa exports 
($1000) 
 
Value Added 
      (%) 
1980 739,888 655,921 83,967 11.35 
1981 432,531 398,764 33,767 7.81 
1982 418,721 385,650 33,071 7.90 
1983 265,833 242,000 23,833 8.97 
1984 380,320 346,956 33,364 8.77 
1985 393,253 358,274 34,979 8.89 
1986 496,671 460,851 35,820 7.21 
1987 529,939 475,109 54,830 10.35 
1988 471,069 428,938 42,131 8.94 
1989 415,501 386,380 29,121 7.01 
1990 398,781 357,000 41,781 10.48 
1991 350,780 315,770 35,010 9.98 
1992 299,030 272,310 26,720 8.94 
1993 280,630 246,350 34,280 12.22 
1994 321,280 295,820 25,460 7.92 
1995 356,750 327,000 29,750 8.34 
1996 712,266 610,869 101,397 14.24 
1997 459,348 368,311 91,037 19.82 
1998 518,063 465,959 52,104 10.06 
1999 463,864 410,652 53,212 11.47 
2000 454,967 404,200 50,767 11.16 
2001 425,423 396,000 29,423 6.92 
2002 557,242 480,964 76,278 13.69 
2003 797,900 676,090 121,810 15.27 
2004 984,034 850,000 134,034 13.62 
2005 914,605 792,151 122,454 13.39 
2006 1,224,309 1,060,000 164,309 13.42 
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2007 1,048,383 895,703 152,680 14.56 
2008 1,045,148 979,098 66,050 6.32 
2009 1,156,557 1,090,910 65,647 5.68 
2010 970,158 847,395 122,763 12.65 
Source: Author’s computation with data from FAOSTAT 
 
1.6 COCOA SUPPLY CHAIN OF GHANA 
The cocoa supply chain of Ghana is characterized by a unique marketing arrangement that combines 
elements of privatization and with a strong government presence. The entire supply chain is made up 
of input suppliers, farmers, collectors/cooperatives, Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) (and their 
clerks who engage in purchases at cocoa buying centres), Haulers, Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) 
(the wholly-owned subsidiary of the COCOBOD with the sole responsibility to market and export 
Ghana cocoa beans to local and foreign buyers), local processors, local retailers, global 
marketers/manufacturers and international and local consumers. Activities on the domestic side in the 
entire chain are supervised by the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) each step of the way. In holding 
firmly unto its high standards in terms of quality of cocoa beans export, the Quality Control Division 
of Ghana under the auspices of the COCOBOD oversees quality control measures at all stages of the 
supply chain. 
 
  Figure 5.0 Cocoa Supply Chain of Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s construct 
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Supply of input in Ghana is mostly in the hands of the private sector. In line with its strategy to raise 
productivity and output, the Government of Ghana (GoG),  through COCOBOD retains an active role 
through subsidized input distribution programs targeting cocoa farmers, although farmers bear 
majority of the cost (World Bank, 2011). The input needs of farmers are met by suppliers through 
marketing of agrochemical (including fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides) and farm equipment. The 
primary role of farmers in the chain is to ensure availability of cocoa beans through a year-round 
production. Cocoa production in the country is dominated by smallholder farmers who cultivate on 
smallholdings with an average size of two to three hectares. About a quarter of production is on a 
share-cropping basis (Hainmueller et al., 2011). After harvesting of cocoa, the beans are dried and 
fermented to help develop the unique flavor and other attributes that attract premium for Ghana cocoa 
beans on the world market. 
 
Once all the necessary post-harvest treatments have been performed, the beans are sold through either 
individual collectors or producer cooperatives to cocoa buying centres established in major cocoa 
producing areas. Such centers are occupied by purchasing clerks of the Licensed Buying Companies. 
The beans are purchased from the farmers at minimum price set by a Producer Price Review 
Committee (PPRC) which comprises COCOBOD officials, a farmer’s representative, government 
representatives and representatives of the Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs). By this, the revenues 
of the LBCs are not based on prices differentials, but rather on volumes of cocoa marketed. Under this 
condition, LBC’s maximize their profits by minimizing “turnaround” times (thus, the period from 
purchase of the beans at farm gate to the selling of them at the takeover centers). 
 
 After purchasing the cocoa, the LBCs invite the Quality Control Division to grade and seal the cocoa 
at a fee determined by the PPRC. The graded and sealed cocoa is then evacuated by the LBCs using 
private cocoa hauliers to designated take over points at Tema, Takoradi and an inland port at Kaase (in 
Kumasi). The rates offered for evacuation are determined by the PPRC, and so are the LBCs paid by 
the COCOBOD according to margins set by the PPRC.  On reaching the take-over points, the graded 
and sealed cocoa is taken over by officials of the Cocoa Marketing Company. The Cocoa Marketing 
Company (Ghana) Limited (CMC) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ghana Cocoa Board and has 
the sole responsibility for the sale and export of Ghana cocoa beans. It major responsibilities include 
procurement of graded and sealed cocoa beans from the LBCs at the take-over points, stocking of 
cocoa prior to shipment, securing optimal prices and maximizing foreign exchange revenues, 
managing sales and collecting receipts, and settling of any disputes via direct arbitration (World Bank, 
2011). 
 
After the take-over, management of cocoa becomes the responsibility of the CMC until it is shipped 
overseas. Prior to shipment however, the Quality Control Division inspects and fumigates all shipping 
vessels and cocoa consignments. A greater share of purchased cocoa beans is exported in the raw form 
with some however been processed. The smaller sized (light crop) beans are sold to processing 
industries in the country at a discount. Light crop beans are smaller in volume than the main crop 
variety exported in the raw form, although the quality of the bean is the same. About 90% of all 
processed cocoa is exported whiles the remaining 10% is used in the production of confectionery 
products (Ashitey, 2012). Export of the domestically processed cocoa products to overseas 
destinations is as well done by the CMC. The processed products that are not exported are sold to 
domestic consumers, and some of the processed products on the international market find their way 
back into the country. Such imports attract a tariff of 20%. 
 
1.7.1 GLOBAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND BALANCE IN THE WORLD MARKET 
After depicting a continuous increasing trend between the years 1984 and 1990, the global 
stocks/grindings ratio took a declining trend from the years 1991 to 2010, showing slight temporal 
increases in the years 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. This observation reflects increasing demand for 
cocoa beans for processing. The gap between supply of the crop and global grindings have been 
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negative on thirteen different occasions between the years 1981 and 2011, implying deficits in global 
supply of cocoa beans. These deficit were observed in the years 1983 (-113,000 Mt), 1984(-
202,000Mt), 1992(-63,000Mt), 1994(-91,000Mt), 1995(-200,000Mt), 1997 (-20,000Mt), 1998(-
78,000Mt), 2001(-220,000Mt), 2002(-29,000Mt), 2005(-38,000Mt), 2007 (-279,000Mt), 2008(-
75,000Mt) and 2010(-138,000Mt) (ICCO, 2012).  As seen from the noted years, most of the deficits 
were recorded in the years between 2000 and 2011 and for half of the years in the 1990s. This signals 
likely increases in future grindings and cautions a need to increase future supply of the crop to help 
meet anticipated increase in future demand 
 
Figure 6.0   Global supply and demand balance of cocoa 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from ICCO (2012) 
Most of the changes observed in world grindings of cocoa are as a result of changes in grindings for 
Europe (mostly for the EU), the Americas, and Asia and Oceania, as these three regions account for 
approximately 82% of global grindings. 
 
Table 4.0 Global grindings of Cocoa 
Region 2008/09          2009/10          2010/11 
             (thousand tonnes) 
2008/09           2009/10            2010/11 
             (Year-on-year change) 
European Union 1348.4 1400.4 1477.7 -90.9 +51.9 +77.4 
Total Europe 1474.7 1523.8 1611.7 -107.6 +49.0 +88.0 
Total Africa 621.7 684.5 657.1 +58.1 +62.8 -27.4 
Total Americas 779.8 814.7 859.9 -51.5 +34.9 +45.2 
Total Asia and Oceania 654.5 707.7 794.6 -143.3 +53.2 +86.8 
World Total 3530.8 3730.7 3923.3 -244.3 +199.9 +192.6 
Source: ICCO, 2012 
 
1.7.2 GLOBAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF COCOA  
 
With global exports of cocoa having increased in recent years from 3133 (“000”) tonnes in the year 
2007 to 3768 (“000”) tonnes in 2011, the role of Africa in global exports of cocoa cannot be 
overstated. Exports from Africa accounted for approximately 77% of world cocoa exports between the 
years 2007 and 2011, with the Americas accounting for 6.3%, and Asia and Oceania 16.3%.  Most of 
the global exports of cocoa however are recorded in the names of five main countries namely Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria and Cameroon. These five countries accounted for 87% of cocoa 
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exports between the years 2007 and 2011. Individually, exports from Côte d’Ivoire represent 37.4% of 
global exports, Ghana 21.7%, Indonesia 14.7%, Nigeria 7.1% and Cameroon 6.1% (ICCO, 2012). 
 
On the import side, global imports of cocoa increased from 3242 (“000”) tonnes in the year 2007 to 
3589 (“000” tonnes) in the year 2011. Import of cocoa by Europe accounted for 58.2% of global 
imports between the years 2007 and 2011, America 26.6%, Asia and Oceania 13.5% and Africa 1.6%. 
Most of the imports however were into the European Union and the United States. Germany accounted 
for 13.1% of global imports between the years 2007 and 2011, Belgium 6.6%, France 5.8%, Russian 
Federation 5.5%, the United Kingdom 5.4%, Italy 4.1% and the United States 19.9% (ICCO, 2012) 
 
Table 5.0 Net exports of cocoa by country 
 
Country/Region  2006/07      2007/08     2008/09      2009/10   2010/11 5-year average 
2006/07-2010/11 
 (thousand tonnes) Share 
World Total 
Total Africa 
Total Americas 
Total Asia and Oceania 
3133              3078           3143          3344        3768 
2402              2431           2402          2508         3002 
195                 139             198           244            266 
535                 508             543           592            501 
3293 
2549 
208 
536 
100.0% 
77.4% 
6.3% 
16.3% 
Members: 
Côte d’Ivoire              
Ghana                         
Nigeria                        
Cameroon                  
Ecuador 
Togo 
Dominican Republic 
Sierra Leone 
Indonesia 
 
1200.15 
702.78 
207.08 
162.77 
110.31 
77.76 
43.00 
8.91 
520.48 
 
1191.38 
673.40 
222.78 
178.79 
115.26 
110.95 
34.11 
11.00 
465.86 
 
1165.25 
603.28 
254.97 
222.67 
117.72 
104.95 
62.87 
9.97 
482.64 
 
1194.94 
698.89 
243.10 
204.66 
149.14 
101.19 
55.39 
14.34 
529.65 
 
1405.06 
902.76 
246.96 
229.48 
155.15 
141.82 
55.14 
10.45 
419.50 
 
1231.36 
716.22 
234.98 
199.67 
129.51 
107.33 
50.10 
10.93 
483.63 
 
37.4% 
21.7% 
7.1% 
6.1% 
3.9% 
3.3% 
1.5% 
0.3% 
14.7% 
Source: ICCO (2012) 
NB: Net exports of cocoa beans plus net exports of cocoa products converted to beans equivalent using the 
following conversion factors: cocoa butter 1.33; cocoa paste/liquor 1.25; cocoa powder and cake 1.18. Totals 
may differ from sum of constituents due to rounding 
 
Table 6.0 Net imports of cocoa by country 
 
Country/Region  2006/07     2007/08     2008/09      2009/10   2010/11 5-year average 
2006/07-2010/11 
 (thousand tonnes) Share 
World Total 
Total Europe 
Total America 
Total Asia and Oceania 
Total Africa 
 
  3242           3163           3169         3182         3589 
  1908           1896           1869         1761         2085 
   822             781            861            914          967 
   465             432            385            452          478 
    46               53              54              55            59 
3269 
1904 
 869 
 443 
  53 
100% 
58.2% 
26.6% 
13.5% 
1.6% 
Members: 
Germany         
Belgium      
France                        
Russia Federation 
United Kingdom                            
Italy 
United States 
 
433.92 
204.43 
230.06 
176.15 
193.71
122.52 
611.87 
 
424.92 
193.31 
184.21 
197.07 
190.80 
141.33 
565.06 
 
417.08 
197.62 
172.83 
168.65 
178.85 
127.12 
662.41 
 
401.54 
224.13 
167.82 
167.82 
168.29 
142.78 
703.99 
 
457.73 
260.00 
193.65 
185.85 
145.88 
143.46 
715.37 
 
427.04 
215.90 
189.72 
179.11 
175.51 
135.44 
651.74 
 
13.1% 
6.6% 
5.8% 
5.5% 
5.4% 
4.1% 
19.9% 
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Canada 
Japan 
Ukraine 
122.82 
144.58 
68.68 
125.53 
87.98 
81.62 
120.12 
103.70 
65.57 
128.01 
105.03 
71.19 
145.06 
103.74 
70.96 
128.31 
109.01 
71.61 
3.9% 
3.3% 
2.2% 
Source: ICCO (2012) 
 
 
1.8 VALUE ADDITION IN WORLD COCOA EXPORTS 
 
In as much as world cocoa exports have increased in recent years, most of the exports are in the raw 
form. The world leading exporter of cocoa, namely Côte d’Ivoire processes between 24% and 35% of 
its cocoa exports, Ghana 6% and 15%, Indonesia 23% and 34%, Nigeria 6% and 14%, and Cameroon 
10% and 27%. None of the major exporters processed more than 40% of its cocoa exports between the 
years 2003 and 2009. In contrast to this however, almost all cocoa exports from minor exporters like 
Thailand, India, Brazil, Mexico and Guatemala (the last two being North American countries) are in 
the processed form, with approximately 90% of exports from Costa Rica also being in the processed 
state. 
 
Table 7.0 Cocoa products as percentage of all cocoa exports (by value) 
 
Countries 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Thailand 100% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Brazil 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
India 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 98% 90% 
Costa Rica 96% 91% 93% 92% 83% 89% 89% 
Côte d’Ivoire 24% 23% 26% 28% 31% 35% 28% 
Indonesia 34% 33% 30% 27% 33% 33% 23% 
Ghana 14% 13% 13% 13% 15% 6% 15% 
Nigeria 6% 9% 9% 14% 14% 10% 10% 
Cameroon 27% 14% 15% 16% 19% 10% 12% 
Mexico 97% 100% 99% 98% 97% 100% 100% 
Guatemala 98% 100% 99% 100% 100% 99% 100% 
Source: ICCO (2012) 
 
 
1.9 GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC PRICES OF COCOA AND INTER-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
 
After depicting a continuous declining trend between the years 1984 and 1992, with the exception of 
the periods 1998-2001 and 2003-2006, world cocoa prices have steadily increased in both nominal and 
real terms since the year 1993. Nominal world price of cocoa observed for the period 1981-2010 was 
highest in the year 2010 (US$ 3246/tonne) and lowest in the year 2000 (US$919/tonne). In real terms 
however, the highest world price of cocoa was observed in the year 1981 (US$ 5,265/tonne), with the 
lowest recorded in the year 2000 (US$ 1201/tonne). In contrast to the fluctuations observed in nominal 
and real world cocoa prices however, the nominal domestic producer price of cocoa depicted a more or 
less continuous increasing trend between the years 1981and 2010. The highest nominal price (GHS 
2400.00, thus in Standard Local Currency) was recorded in the year 2010, with the lowest (GHS 0.53) 
recorded in the year 1981. In contrast to the observation in nominal domestic producer price however, 
the real producer price of cocoa in Ghana went through some fluctuations, adjusting to changes in real 
world price of cocoa at some points in time, with the highest price (GHS 1270.24) been recorded in 
the year 2010 and the lowest (GHS 213.20) in the year 1981. Decreases observed in real domestic 
prices were minor as compared to the real world price and lasted for relatively shorter period of time. 
This observation is attributed to the shielding of Ghanaian cocoa farmers against world price volatility 
by the government through the use of a price stabilization system. 
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Figure 7.0 Trends in domestic and international price of cocoa 
 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from ICCO (2012), FAOSTAT and own-computation 
 
In contrast to Ghanaian farmers who have for some time benefited from guaranteed prices however, 
farmers in Côte d’Ivoire market their crop on a spot basis throughout the harvest period, with prices 
determined nearly exclusively by changes in international cocoa prices (World Bank, 2011). This 
implies that, whenever international cocoa price moves higher or lower throughout the harvesting 
season, a disparity in price is created between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. In times of increasing world 
price of cocoa,  the farm gate price in Côte d’Ivoire mostly rise above COCOBOD’s fixed price, with 
the opposite been observed in times of decreasing world price of cocoa. Such disparity in prices 
according to Bulíř (1998) increases incentive to either sell on the domestic market or smuggle cocoa 
into Côte d’Ivoire in times of favorable prices on the Ivorian black market. Smuggling of cocoa 
however hinders COCOBOD’s ability to accurately forecast and hedge output (World Bank, 2011). 
 
Fig 8.0   Global and inter-country price comparison 
 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from ICCO (2012), FAOSTAT and own-computation 
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2.0 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
The current study analyzes the performance of Ghana in export of cocoa (exports of cocoa bean, 
processed cocoa products and total cocoa exports) and estimates the magnitude and effects of key 
economic determinants of cocoa exports, production and domestic producer price. Although domestic 
price of cocoa is set by the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) at the beginning of each harvest 
season, information on internal and external influences on producer price could be useful to farmers, 
policy makers, prospective investors, and in agribusiness planning. Such information could as well be 
useful to COCOBOD and its Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC).  Achievement of these goals 
involved the use of time series data on vital variables specified in latter sections of the study. All data 
for the study were collected from the agricultural production database of FAO (FAOSTAT), the 
International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) 
 
2.1 COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Trade theory suggests that the competitiveness of a country for a specific commodity is based on the 
concept of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage in a two-country, two-input case under the 
Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin models postulates that, trade flows among other factors are the result of 
differences in production cost among countries and that a given country will specialize in the 
production of a good in which it has comparative advantage. Several trade measures have been 
suggested in past studies for measuring a country’s competitiveness in a commodity. Among such 
measures are the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Balassa 1965), Relative Import Advantage 
and Relative Trade Advantage (Vollrath, 1991), the Net Export Index (NEI) (Banterle and Carraresi, 
2007), Export Market Shares (EMS) as a simple measure of competitiveness (Latruffe. 2010), and 
Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (as index of competitiveness) (Nwachuku et al, 2010). 
 
The current study analyzes the competitiveness of Ghana in its export of cocoa using the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (RCA) measure suggested by Balassa (1965) and the Revealed Symmetric 
Comparative Advantage (RSCA) measure employed by Nwachuku et al (2010). 
 
 Revealed Comparative Advantage, RCA 
This measure calculates the ratio of a country’s export share of a commodity in the international 
market to the country’s export share of all other commodities. In the current study however, RCA is 
defined as follows 
 
RCAij  = (Xij/Xit) / (Xjw/Xtw) 
 
Where Xij is the value of Ghana’s exports of cocoa (beans, processed cocoa, and total cocoa exports); 
Xit is the total value of agricultural exports of Ghana; Xjw is the value of world exports of cocoa 
(beans, processed, and total cocoa exports); and Xtw is the world total value of agricultural exports 
  
 Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) 
 
The Revealed Comparative Advantage according to Nwachuku and colleagues, could be made 
symmetric by obtaining an index called Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA). This is 
computed as follows: 
 
RSCA = (RCA-1 / RCA+1), and it varies from -1 to +1. The closer the value is to +1, the higher the 
competitiveness of a country in the commodity of interest. 
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These measures of competitiveness for Ghana are estimated for the periods1964-1969 (the immediate 
years following the collapse of world cocoa prices), 1983-1992 (Reform and Adjustment Period) and 
the period 2000-2010 (the recent decade) 
 
 
2.2 DETERMINANTS OF COCOA EXPORT, PRODUCTION AND PRODUCER PRICE 
 
In estimating the determinants of cocoa export, production and domestic producer price, data on the 
individual series were verified through the Phillips-Perron Unit root test (trend and intercept at level, 
intercept on first difference). After performing the test (on condition that no I(2) variable is found), the 
following regression equation was estimated: 
 
Equation for cocoa exports: 
 
ln QEt = β0 + β1 ln DPt-1 + β2 ln RPt + β3 ln (RWPt / RPt)+ β4 ln RCPt + β5 ln DCt-1 + β6 ln EXRt  
                      + β7 NRAt-2 +β8 ln FDIt +β9 ln QEt-1 + β10 ln SGRt +  ut  
 
A priori exp.:  DPt-1>0; RPt >0; (RWPt/RPt) < >0; RCPt<0; DCt-1<0; EXRt>0; NRAt-2< >0; FDIt < >0; 
QEt-1< >0; SGRt <0 
 
Equation for cocoa production: 
 
ln DPt = β0 + β1 ln RPt-1 + β2 ln (RWPt-1 / RPt-1) + β3 ln QEt + β4 ln EXRt + β5 NRAt + +β6 ln YLDt                           
                            +β7 ln FDIt + ut  
 
A priori exp.: RPt-1>0; (RWPt-1/RPt-1) < >0 ; QEt < >0 ; EXRt < >0; NRAt > 0; YLDt >0; FDIt >0 
 
Equation for domestic producer price of cocoa: 
 
ln Pt = β0 + β1 ln Pt-1 + β2 ln WPt-1  + β3 ln QEt-1 + β4 ln EXRt + β5 NRAt  +β6 ln SGRt-1 +β7DPt-1 
                  +β8 ln DCt-1 +  ut  
 
A priori exp.: Pt-1>0; WPt-1>0; QEt-1 < >0 ; EXRt < >0; NRAt >0 ; SGRt-1<0; DPt-1<0; DCt-1>0 
 
 Where QEt      -   quantity of cocoa beans export (tonnes) 
             DPt    -   production of cocoa beans (tonnes) 
             RPt    -   real domestic producer price of cocoa beans (Standard Local Currency, GHS) 
 (RWPt / RPt)   -    real world price of cocoa to real domestic producer price of cocoa ratio 
            RCPt  -    real producer price of cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivorian Local Currency, FCFA) 
              DCt  -    domestic consumption of cocoa (tonnes) 
            EXRt  -    exchange rate (GHS/US$) 
            NRAt  -    nominal rate of assistance (%) 
            SGRt  -    world stocks/grindings ratio (%) 
             FDIt   -    foreign direct investment (US$ million at current prices and current exchange rates) 
            YLDt  -    yield of cocoa (Mt/ha) 
                  Pt -    nominal domestic producer price of cocoa (Standard Local Currency, GHS) 
               WPt -    nominal world price of cocoa (US$/tonne) 
                  β0 -     Intercept term 
                  βi -     coefficients/ elasticities 
                  ut -     Stochastic error term assumed to be iidN(0Σ) 
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3.0 RESULTS 
This section of the current study is divided into two parts:  
 The first part is on analysis of the performance (competitiveness) of Ghana in its export of 
cocoa (covering aggregate export of cocoa, export of cocoa beans and export of cocoa 
products). This part focuses on the periods 1964-69, 1983-92 and 2000-2010 
 The second part is on estimation of the magnitude and effects of key economic determinants of 
cocoa exports, production and domestic producer price for the period 1981-2009 
 
3.1 COMPETITIVENESS OF GHANA’S COCOA EXPORTS 
Result on the performance of Ghana in its export of cocoa shows that the country is highly competitive 
in total export of cocoa, in export of cocoa beans and in export of processed cocoa. Its performance 
however, is highest in export of cocoa beans than in export of processed cocoa and in total cocoa 
exports. For the three periods under consideration, the country’s competitiveness in aggregate export 
of cocoa and in cocoa beans export was lowest during the period 1964-1969. This observation is 
attributed to the collapse in world price of cocoa during that period coupled with inappropriate 
government policies implemented in the immediate post-independence period. 
 
Table 8.0   Performance of Ghana in cocoa exports 
Year Total cocoa exports 
RCA                  RSCA 
Cocoa beans export 
RCA             RSCA 
Processed Cocoa exports 
     RCA            RSCA 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
        60.721               0.968 
        63.973               0.969 
        69.187               0.972 
        53.828               0.964 
        49.324               0.960 
        41.480               0.953 
    70.199          0.972 
    74.749          0.974 
    82.339          0.976 
    60.304          0.967 
    57.716          0.966 
    50.886          0.961 
     18.807         0.899 
     22.019         0.913 
     25.185         0.924 
     33.191         0.942 
     25.670         0.925 
     16.735         0.887 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
        62.002               0.968 
        47.380               0.959 
        41.159               0.953 
        41.781               0.953 
        47.461               0.959 
        60.203               0.967 
        69.216               0.972 
        78.131               0.974 
        83.412               0.976 
        91.669               0.978 
    95.285          0.979 
    70.525          0.972 
    64.195          0.969 
    63.136          0.969 
    69.709          0.972 
    91.288          0.978 
    105.890        0.981 
    131.703        0.984 
    143.739        0.986 
    167.824        0.988 
     13.636         0.863 
     10.737         0.830 
     8.803           0.796 
     7.807           0.773 
     12.604         0.853 
     13.478         0.862 
     12.370         0.850 
     17.457         0.892 
     17.431         0.891 
     16.298         0.884      
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
        79.798               0.975 
        76.122               0.974 
        53.236               0.963 
        48.089               0.959 
        50.682               0.961 
        55.684               0.965 
        60.157               0.967 
        60.950               0.968 
        54.683               0.964 
        50.674               0.961 
        47.858               0.959 
    138.181        0.986 
    134.167        0.985 
    83.331          0.976 
    79.946          0.975 
    91.766          0.978 
    102.362        0.981 
    104.946        0.981 
    112.000        0.982 
    110.928        0.982 
    91.913          0.978 
    90.615          0.978 
     18.286         0.896 
     11.157         0.835 
     16.244         0.884 
     14.973         0.875 
     13.201         0.859 
     14.097         0.868 
     16.028         0.883 
     16.590         0.886 
     6.421           0.731 
     5.993           0.714 
     11.242         0.837 
Source: Author’s computation with data from FAOSTAT 
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Following the collapse in world price of cocoa in 1964, the government printed money into the system 
to help meet expenses, thereby fuelling inflation in the process and lowering real wages. It in addition 
overvalued the cedi, which consequently resulted in a sharp decline in value of the domestic currency 
equivalent of the f.o.b. price of cocoa and tightened the struggle over cocoa revenue between farmers 
and the government. In the same period, cost of the then Cocoa Marketing Board’s (CMB’s) activities 
increased and smuggling of cocoa into neighboring Côte d’Ivoire accelerated  due to the relative 
higher producer prices at the black market exchange rate in Côte d’Ivoire between the years 1964-69 
(Stryker, 1990). These made export of cocoa beans in the country less competitive and exporters had 
limited incentive to export the raw product. 
 
In spite of these drawbacks, cocoa production in the country during the same period depicted an 
increasing trend. Increased production and limited incentive to export raw cocoa beans due to the 
collapse in world price of cocoa beans, stimulated domestic processing of cocoa to help minimize 
losses to farmers and ensure continuous production of cocoa. This explains the relatively high figures 
of the RCA and the RSCA in terms of export of processed cocoa during the period 1964-69 (This is as 
well clarified by the value addition figure in the Appendix –thus figure A.2) 
 
Initiation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in April 1983 helped address inefficiencies in 
fiscal disciplines and in reformation of the market. It in addition, led to increased inflows of external 
financing and general increase in national income. Exchange rate policy was as well improved 
(through depreciation to stimulate exports), national budget was regularly balanced, government’s 
financing needs were lowered and inflation was brought under control. The share of farmers in export 
price (net f.o.b.) was gradually increased through a reduction in farm taxation from 82.05% in 1983 to 
24.60% in 1992. Joint effect of these improvements led to a recovery in the performance of the cocoa 
sub-sector regardless of the low nominal and real world price of cocoa during the period 1983-92. This 
led to an increase in performance of the country in its export of cocoa beans and in aggregate cocoa 
exports relative to the period 1964-69. The increase in Ghana’s competitiveness in cocoa exports 
during the period 1983-92 could as well be attributed to initiation of the Agricultural Services 
Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) between the years 1987-1990. This project was initiated among other 
things to strengthen the institutional framework for formulating and implementing agricultural policies 
and program, improve the delivery of public sector services, and improve the procurement and 
distribution of agricultural inputs by way of privatization (Sharma and Morrison, 2011). It succeeded 
in strengthening the capacity of agricultural research, extension, and policy planning. Improvement in 
these three dimensions was critical in revitalization of the cocoa sub-sector. 
 
The relatively higher performance of Ghana in total exports of cocoa and cocoa beans in specific for 
the period 2000-2010 over that for the period 1964-69 is attributed to the increasing government 
support to farmers and opening-up of the domestic market to competition through partial liberalization 
of internal marketing, thereby allowing licensed buyers to engage in cocoa purchases as against earlier 
periods where only the Producer Buying Company (PBC) was given a sole license. The relatively 
lower RCA and RSCA figures for processed cocoa exports for the period 2000-2010 as against those 
for the period 1964-69 could be attributed to the increasing global demand of cocoa beans for grinding 
(which attracts export of raw products), inefficiencies in domestic processing due to low capacity, the 
decreasing share of Ghana in world grindings due to intensifying competition from uprising and major 
competitors, and increasing domestic demand for processed cocoa products which consequently 
decreases the quantity of processed products exported. 
 
 
3.2    DETERMINANTS OF COCOA EXPORT, PRODUCTION AND PRODUCER PRICE 
Prior to estimation of the respective regression equations (with all variables in log form except the 
nominal rate of assistance (NRA)), the whole set of data was verified to ascertain the order of 
integration of the individual series. Ascertaining the order of integration of the respective series is a 
vital step in the data generation process and in choosing the appropriate estimator. The Phillips-Perron 
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unit root test was used in the current study for verification. Output from the test shows that with the 
exception of the annual volume of cocoa beans exported and annual production (output) of cocoa 
beans, all the variables specified in the three regression equations are non-stationary at level, but 
become stationary at first difference. Volume of cocoa beans exported is found stationary at level at 
the 5% significance level, with annual production of cocoa beans being stationary at level at the 1% 
significance level. Based on the outcome of the unit root test, the respective equations were estimated 
using the Ordinary Least Squares estimator. 
 
Estimates for the three regression equations were tested for appropriate standard Gaussian properties 
namely absence of serial correlation, normality and homoscedastic nature of the residuals. They were 
also test for stability (and reliability) with the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests, the results of 
which are presented in the appendix section of the current study. Tests on the Gaussian assumptions 
for the respective regression equations show that the residual series for each of the equations is 
normality distributed, homoscedastic, and free from the problem of serial correlation. Estimates for 
each equation were confirmed to be reliable and stable by the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests. 
 
Table 9.0     Phillips-Perron unit root test of variables (trend + intercept at level, intercept at first diff.) 
Series Test stat. 
Level 
N-W 
B.width 
Test stat. 
First diff. 
N-W 
B.width 
Conclusion on 
Level 
ln  QEt -4.152016** 6 -8.298286*** 3 I(0) 
ln  DPt -7.436038*** 25 -10.80197*** 26 I(0) 
ln  DCt -2.446304 3 -6.959233*** 3 I(1) 
     NRAt -1.350541 1 -5.237757*** 3 I(1) 
ln  EXRt -1.078407 0 -3.399529** 4 I(1) 
ln  Pt -2.668138 1 -4.590585*** 1 I(1) 
ln  RPt -3.349479 1 -7.055645*** 4 I(1) 
ln  WPt -0.542015 9 -3.623870** 6 I(1) 
ln  RWPt -0.316034 10 -3.583725** 6 I(1) 
ln  FDIt -2.584939 2 -4.954059*** 4 I(1) 
ln  SGRatiot -1.578200 0 -4.153274*** 0 I(1) 
ln  YLDt -1.964068 1 -5.825100*** 1 I(1) 
ln  RCPt -2.629281 4 -6.297162*** 6 I(1) 
(RWPt / RPt) -2.319115 0 -6.858841*** 0 I(1) 
Critical Value (5%) -3.580623  -2.976263   
 
 Determinants of cocoa export 
Export of cocoa (beans in specific) is found to be significantly driven by lagged output (production), 
lagged domestic demand (consumption), real producer price, real world price to real producer price 
ratio, real producer price in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, prevailing exchange rate and by lagged export. 
The intercept is also significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 10.504, implying that, should all 
things remain constant, Ghana would continue to export significant quantities of cocoa beans. 
 
Domestic production of cocoa beans in the previous year has a coefficient of 0.667, significant at the 
5% level. This implies that a unit increase in output of cocoa in Ghana in time t-1 leads to a 0.667% 
increase in the country’s export of cocoa in time t. Lagged instead of current production is used for the 
study because of the strategy employed by most exporters in pursuit of maximizing their profits. 
Increases in output in times of declining world price prompts most exporters to withhold a portion of 
the crop to take advantage of potential price increases later in the season or in the subsequent year. 
Exports therefore respond more appropriately to lag outputs than they do current outputs. Higher 
levels of production in time t at a favorable world price in time t would still lead to increases in stock 
on the domestic market to help minimize the adverse effects of adding-up on the global market which 
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results in decreasing world prices. Increases in production and stock for the previous year helps in 
bridging deficit in the current year’s output to ensure sufficient quantities of cocoa beans on the 
domestic market for both exports in raw form and for domestic processing. 
 
A unit increase in real producer price of cocoa leads to a 0.339% increase in exports, and this response 
is found to be significant at the 5% level. Increases in the real farm gate price of cocoa incites farmers 
to sell most of their produce to domestic licensed buyers as against smuggling them into neighboring 
countries with higher prices on the black market. In addition, increases in real farm gate price of cocoa 
helps farmers to invest appropriately in their fields in hope for better and sustainable outputs in the 
coming years. An increase in the real producer price of cocoa therefore affects cropping decisions, as 
well as farmers’ decisions to sell domestically or to smuggle. In his report on the “price incentive to 
smuggle and the cocoa supply in Ghana”, Bulíř (1998) found that, some farmers even decide not to 
collect their current crop if the offered producer prices are too low. This shows that real producer price 
is a crucial factor in the supply decision of farmers, and setting it too low may have depressing effect 
on export. 
 
 The effect of the real world to real domestic price ratio of cocoa was a priori believed could go either 
way, as increases in this ratio is possible under four different scenarios; 
- Increases in world price, whiles domestic price is held constant 
- Decreases in domestic price, whiles world price is held constant 
- Increases in both, but more in world price than in domestic price 
- Decreases in both, but more in domestic price than in world price 
The positive (0.326) and significant effect (at the 10% level) observed for this ratio shows that in as 
much as exporters would export more in times of increases in this ratio (due to increasing profit on 
their part), any negative reaction on the part of farmers in times of a decrease in the ratio is not 
significant. This could be attributed to the high dependence of most cocoa farmers on the crop for 
sustenance, and in-kind benefit farmers receive through government assistance and bonuses from 
buyers. 
 
Table 10.0   Determinants of cocoa beans export 
Variables                     Coefficients               Standard error           t-Statistic           
ln DPt-1                         0.666796                    0.231395                  2.881631** 
ln RPt                            0.339086                   0.156346                   2.168812** 
ln (RWPt/RPt)              0.326231                   0.171440                   1.902885* 
ln RCPt                       -0.331410                   0.138935                  -2.385364**  
ln DCt-1                       -0.067113                    0.031097                  -2.158205** 
ln EXRt                        0.197926                   0.084700                   2.336800** 
    NRAt-2                            0.115020                    0.344817                   0.333569 
ln FDIt                        -0.049050                    0.040371                  -1.214972 
ln QEt-1                       -0.343774                    0.190541                  -1.804196*  
ln SGRt                        0.201452                    0.212349                    0.948687 
Intercept                      10.50421                    3.340458                    3.144541*** 
Adj. R
2
                         0.919125              Akaike info criterion     -1.197539  
Durbin-Watson Stat     2.390825             Schwarz criterion           -0.669606 
F-statistic                     30.54827             Hannan-Quinn criter.     -1.040557 
Prob.(F-statistic)          0.000000             Jarque-Bera                     0.043094 (0.978684) 
Log likelihood             27.16678              B-G LM test F-stat (1)   1.184173 (0.2937) 
S.E. of regression        0.114923              B-G LM test F-stat (2)   0.554349 (0.5866) 
Mean dependent var    12.57919              ARCH test F-stat           2.355522 (0.1379) 
S.D. dependent var      0.404110              Q-stat (1, 2)                   1.5057(0.220); 1.8064(0.405) 
Sum squared resid       0.211317              ADF Test of residual     -6.206595*** 
***1%, **5%, *10% 
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A unit increase in the real producer price of cocoa in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire leads to a 0.331% 
decrease in cocoa exports of Ghana, and this decrease is significant at the 5% level. With domestic 
farmers been shielded from world price volatility through guaranteed prices as against their Ivorian 
counterparts who market the crop on a spot basis throughout the harvest period, prices in Côte d’Ivoire 
are determined nearly exclusively by movements in international cocoa futures price (World Bank, 
2011). By this, whenever the international price of cocoa moves higher or lower throughout the 
harvesting season, a price disparity is created, with farm gate price in Côte d’Ivoire being mostly 
above COCOBOD’s fixed price in times of increasing international price of cocoa. Such price 
disparities create incentive for smuggling, thereby reducing the volumes of cocoa beans available on 
the domestic market for export and for domestic processing. Smuggling of cocoa in turn is reported by 
the World Bank (2011) to hinder COCOBOD’s ability to accurately forecast and hedge output. In 
addition, during the period 2008-2011, smuggling is reported by the World Bank to have resulted in 
estimated financial losses to GoG and other stakeholders in the supply chain in excess of US$158.9 
million. 
 
A unit increase in domestic demand for cocoa leads to a 0.067% decrease in the volume of cocoa 
beans exported, and this decrease is significant at the 5% level. This observation affirms a suggestion 
(an argument) by Ball (1966) in his study on “The relationship between UK export performance in 
manufacturers and the internal pressure of demand” that at relatively high levels of domestic demand, 
the quantity of resources devoted to export is lower. So at lower domestic demand, the surplus from 
production leads to increased export volume. As long as domestic demand increases, export of cocoa 
beans would decrease by virtue of “pulling effect”, unless domestic output of cocoa beans is increased 
significantly at equivalent or higher rates than domestic demand. Under such condition, there is a 
possibility that the “pulling effect” of domestic demand would not be significant. 
 
A unit increase in exchange rate of Ghana (GHS/US$) leads to a 0.198% increase in the country’s 
export of cocoa beans, and this increase is significant at the 5% level. An increase in this rate implies 
depreciation in value of the local currency of Ghana, and this makes exports cheaper in international 
markets resulting in increased demand for exports. CMC (the subsidiary of COCOBOD in charge of 
export) then responds to increasing global demand for high quality Ghanaian cocoa by increasing the 
volumes of cocoa it exports. As a major player on the world cocoa market, expansion of exports from 
Ghana in period t-1, ceteris paribus, could lead to a substantial decline in world market prices for 
cocoa by virtue of “adding-up” effect. As agents who operate to maximize profits, exporters in times 
of decreasing prices of cocoa on the world market limit the volumes they export in subsequent years in 
hope for better prices. Restriction of exports by major players on the other hand could trigger higher 
prices of cocoa on the world market. With Ghana holding the second largest share (21%) in cocoa 
exports on the global pedestal, a unit increase in the country’s export of cocoa in time t-1, is seen to 
lead to a decrease in export by 0.344% in time t. This decrease is significant at the 10% 
 
Increasing stocks/grindings ratio under normal circumstances is expected to trigger a significant 
decline in global demand for cocoa beans. Ghana however is shielded from such effect due to the high 
quality of beans it exports. This statement is made in support of the positive (0.201) although 
insignificant (instead of a negative) coefficient observed for the SGR in Table 10.0. The effects of 
nominal rate of assistance and foreign direct investment (inflows) on exports were found to be 
insignificant. The role of FDI on export promotion has in empirical literature been found to be 
controversial. Pfaffermayr (1996) found a significant positive effect of FDI on export. However, in 
their study on the “Determinants of export structure of countries in Central and Eastern Europe”, 
Hoekman and Djankov (1997) found an insignificant effect of FDI on export. The role of FDI in 
export promotion in developing countries therefore depends crucially on the motive for such 
investment (Majeed and Ahmad, 2006). If the motive for such investment is to capture domestic 
market (tariff-jumping type investment), it may not contribute to export growth, but if such investment 
is made with an export-oriented motive (due to the comparative advantage of the recipient country), 
then it may contribute to export growth. A total of about 91.91% of variations in cocoa beans export of 
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Ghana between the years 1981 and 2009 are explained by variables specified in the equation on cocoa 
exports in section 2.2. The joint effect of all the variables on export is highly significant (reflected by 
the F-statistic and its associated probability value) 
 
 Determinants of cocoa production 
Production of cocoa beans in Ghana is dependent on by lagged real producer price, lagged real world 
price to real producer price ratio, nominal rate of assistance, exchange rate, yield, and foreign direct 
investment. The intercept term has a coefficient of 4.624 significant at the 1% level. This implies that, 
should all things remain constant, farmers would continue to supply significant volumes of beans on 
the domestic market. This confirms the high dependence of most cocoa farmers on the crop for 
sustenance. 
 
A unit increase in lagged real producer price of cocoa leads to a 0.372% increase in output in the 
subsequent year, significant at the 1% level. An increase in the farm gate price received by cocoa 
farmers increases their financial base and enables them to meet the increasing cost of pest control, 
disease control, fertilization of their fields and the high cost of labor among other things. Addressing 
these areas is crucial to ensuring high productivity of farmers’ fields through increases in yield and 
output. A unit increase in the lagged relative real price(s) leads to a 0.504% increase in output, 
significant at the 1% level. With increases in profits of exporters and buyers due to an increase in this 
ratio comes increasing demand for beans in the subsequent years. With a possibility of this ratio 
increasing due to a decreasing real domestic producer price, farmers continue to invest in their fields 
with hope of getting a higher price for their producer due to a likely increase in the profits of buyers 
and exporters. This observations could as well be attributed to the high dependence of most cocoa 
farmers on the crop for sustenance, thereby responding inappropriately to declines in the price they 
receive (thus under the condition of the ratio increasing due to a relative decrease in real producer 
price). 
 
 
Table 11.0   Determinants of cocoa beans production 
Variables                     Coefficients               Standard error           t-Statistic           
ln RPt-1                          0.372298                   0.095155                   3.912534*** 
ln (RWPt-1/RPt-1)           0.504200                  0.094430                    5.339419***  
    NRAt                         0.376944                  0.199424                    1.890165* 
ln EXRt                         0.156628                  0.036819                    4.254054*** 
ln YLDt                         0.370040                  0.106295                    3.481266*** 
ln FDIt                          0.050030                   0.025264                    1.980275*  
ln QEt                           0.457878                   0.087659                    5.223406*** 
Intercept                        4.624555                  1.137396                    4.065913*** 
Adj. R
2
                         0.968358              Akaike info criterion     -1.883437  
Durbin-Watson Stat     2.367158             Schwarz criterion           -1.502807 
F-statistic                     119.0421             Hannan-Quinn criter.     -1.767074 
Prob.(F-statistic)          0.000000             Jarque-Bera                     0.473687 (0.789115) 
Log likelihood             34.36812              B-G LM test F-stat (1)   1.026535 (0.3237) 
S.E. of regression        0.083900              B-G LM test F-stat (2)    0.600591 (0.5591) 
Mean dependent var    12.76697              ARCH test F-stat            0.041589 (0.8401) 
S.D. dependent var      0.471658              Q-stat (1, 2)                     1.2060(0.272); 1.2702(0.530) 
Sum squared resid       0.140793              ADF Test of residual      -6.078271*** 
***1%, **5%, *10% 
A unit increase in nominal rate of assistance, as a measure of government support, leads to a 0.377% 
increase in output, significant at the 10% level. Increase in government’s support through an increase 
in the share of export price (net f.o.b.) received by farmers’ and a decrease in farm taxation, increases 
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the financial base of farmers and enable them to timely meet the cost of performing vital cultural 
practices on their fields like pest and disease control through spraying, and fertilizer application 
among others. In addition, increasing government’s assistance to farmers enables them to increase the 
land area on which they plant cocoa trees, resulting in the planting of more trees (although not a 
commendable move in terms of environmental sustainability)  
 
A unit increase in exchange rate leads to an increase of 0.157% in output, significant at the 1% level. 
With cocoa farmers currently been shield from global cocoa price and exchange rate volatilities, 
increasing exchange rate which consequently stimulate export growth has rather beneficial effect to 
producers than it would have been without government assistance. The shielding of farmers against 
volatility in exchange rate allows local prices to increase even when international prices fall. This 
coupled with the stimulation of export growth by depreciation of the currency triggers output growth. 
Although depreciation of the currency leads to increased cost of vital inputs used in production (like 
fertilizer, pesticides, fungicides among others), such inputs are mostly subsidized by the government 
(although farmers bear majority of the cost). 
 
A unit increase in yield leads to a 0.370% increase in cocoa output, significant at the 1% level. 
Increase in output per unit area is a reflection of increased productivity of farmers’ fields as a result of 
increasing fertility of the fields, better control of pests and diseases, and timely harvesting of produce. 
Any improvements observed in these areas would under normal circumstances have the obvious 
positive effect on output. With most of the very suitable and moderately suitable lands for cocoa 
cropping currently been exhausted, increasing yields of farmers’ fields may be the sustainable and 
recommendable way to ensure future increases in cocoa outputs. A unit increase in foreign direct 
investment leads to a 0.050% increases in output, significant at the 10% level. The effect of foreign 
direct investment on output is mostly manifested through spill-over effects (from improved cropping 
techniques) and in diseases and pest control programs. These help in achieving higher yields and in 
promoting environmental sustainability. A significant positive association is observed between current 
exports and output. A unit increase in export leads to 0.458% increase in output. This effect was found 
to be significant at the 1% level, implying that increases in exports of cocoa beans stimulate 
production of it in the country. With increases in export comes decreasing stock on the domestic front 
and corresponding increase in demand for raw materials for export and domestic processing. 
Increasing demand as well comes with increasing prices which all things being equal have beneficial 
effect as against adverse effect on producers. 
 
A total of about 96.84% of variations in output observed between the years 1981 and 2009 are 
explained by variables specified in the equation on cocoa production in section 2.2. The joint effect of 
all the variables is highly significant. 
 
 
 Determinants of domestic producer price of cocoa 
With the setting of producer price at the beginning of each harvest season by the Producer Price 
Review Committee (PPRC) based on nominal as against real values, nominal instead of real prices 
were used in the equation on domestic producer price in section 2.2. Producer price of cocoa is found 
to be dependent on lagged nominal producer price, lagged nominal world price of cocoa, nominal rate 
of assistance, exchange rate, lagged stocks/grindings and lagged domestic consumption. Contrary to 
the observation for cocoa beans exports and production however, the intercept term for the producer 
price equation is not significant. This implies that without any significant change(s) in any of the 
variables, there would be no significant increase or decrease in producer price of cocoa. 
 
With producer price set without prior knowledge of future world price of cocoa, domestic prices are 
set mostly based on knowledge of past prices and future expectations (the effect of the latter been 
mostly captured in the nominal rate of assistance). A unit increase in lagged nominal producer price 
leads to a 0.341% increase in domestic producer price of cocoa, significant at the 5% level. A unit 
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increase in lagged world price leads to a 0.476% increase in domestic producer price of cocoa, 
significant at the 10% level. By this, in as much as a greater percentage of export price (net f.o.b.) goes 
to farmers, an increase in world price of cocoa tends to benefit the Cocoa Marketing Company (sole 
exporter) than it does producers due to the relatively low transmission of increments in price as 
reflected by the coefficient of the lagged nominal world price. In considering the share of farmers in 
export price and the degree of transmission of increments, both cocoa producers and the CMC benefit 
at the end of the day, thereby leaving no losers to be compensated by winners.  
 
A unit increase in the nominal rate of assistance through a decrease in farm taxation and increase of 
farmers share in export price of cocoa leads to a 0.911% increase in nominal producer price of cocoa, 
significant at the 5% level. Decreasing farm taxation implies that relatively smaller share of farm 
income accrued through sales of cocoa is taxed. Consequently, relatively higher portions of revenue 
from sales go to farmers as against periods with high taxation of farm income. A unit increase in 
exchange rate leads to a 0.576% increase in producer price of cocoa, significant at the 1% level. 
Devaluation (depreciation) of the Ghanaian Cedi against major international currencies (coupled with 
the present shielding of farmers against price and exchange rate volatilities) allows local producer 
price to increase even in times of declining international prices. An increase in exchange rate as well 
makes exports cheaper, stimulates demand on the global market, and with it comes increases in price 
of cocoa. A unit increase in stocks/grindings ratio leads to a 0.765% decrease in nominal producer 
price of cocoa, significant at the 1% level.  Increasing stocks/grindings ratio implies excess supply of 
cocoa beans on the global market and with such condition comes decreasing demand for cocoa beans 
and a corresponding decrease in global price of cocoa. Although COCOBOD is reported to have never 
lowered the farm gate price of cocoa since the launching of fixed-farmer price program (World Bank, 
2011), any future deviations from this could be due to changes in global prices induced by changes in 
global stocks/grindings ratio. 
 
Table 12.0  Determinants of producer price of cocoa  
Variables                     Coefficients               Standard error            t-Statistic           
ln  Pt-1                            0.341493                  0.141699                    2.409984** 
ln WPt-1                         0.476386                  0.243049                    1.960069*  
    NRAt                         0.911124                  0.359758                    2.532605** 
ln EXRt                         0.575659                  0.153808                    3.742703*** 
ln QEt-1                         0.137491                   0.208296                    0.660072 
ln SGRt-1                      -0.764885                  0.247030                   -3.096320***  
ln DPt-1                        -0.051911                   0.223720                   -0.232035 
ln DCt-1                         0.091472                   0.036476                   -2.507705** 
Intercept                       2.310120                   2.473115                    0.934093 
Adj. R
2 
                         0.995796             Akaike info criterion     -0.811656  
Durbin-Watson Stat     2.370630             Schwarz criterion           -0.383447 
F-statistic                     800.3441             Hannan-Quinn criter.     -0.680748 
Prob.(F-statistic)          0.000000             Jarque-Bera                      2.081024 (0.353274) 
Log likelihood             20.36318              B-G LM test F-stat (1)    1.622989 (0.2189) 
S.E. of regression        0.141945              B-G LM test F-stat (2)    2.192978 (0.1421) 
Mean dependent var    4.271568              ARCH test F-stat            0.201559 (0.6573) 
S.D. dependent var      2.189104              Q-stat (1, 2)                    1.7162(0.190); 3.0473(0.218) 
Sum squared resid       0.382822              ADF Test of residual     -4.545900*** 
***1%, **5%, *10% 
A unit increase in domestic consumption of cocoa leads to a 0.091% increase in producer price of 
cocoa, significant at the 5% level. An increase in producer price with increasing domestic 
consumption is a measure to incite farmers to increase supply of cocoa beans for both export and for 
domestic consumption. Increasing supply of the cocoa beans could help mitigate the adverse/pulling 
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effect of domestic consumption on exports. A total of about 99.58% of variations in nominal farm gate 
price of cocoa between the years 1981 and 2009 are explained by variables specified in the producer 
price equation in section 2.2, and their joint effect is highly significant 
 
 
 
4.0 SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In contributing towards achievement of the Government of Ghana’s medium term objective of adding 
value to the country’s cocoa exports and at the same time maintaining its reputable position on the 
world market for cocoa, the current study analyzed the competitiveness of Ghana in its total cocoa 
exports, cocoa beans export and processed cocoa exports. In addition, it estimated the magnitude and 
effects of key economic determinants of cocoa exports (focusing on beans), production and domestic 
producer price (mostly set at the beginning of the harvest season). 
 
In analyzing the competitiveness of the country in its export of cocoa, three periods were considered 
namely 1964-69 (immediate years following the collapse of world price of cocoa), 1983-92 (Reform 
and adjustment period) and 2000-2010 (recent decade). The Revealed Comparative Advantage 
measure suggested by Balassa (1965) and the Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage employed 
by Nwachuku et al (2010) were used in the analysis. Figures on the RCA and RSCA for the respective 
periods show that Ghana has comparative advantage in exports of cocoa beans, processed cocoa and in 
its total export of cocoa (thus raw and processed). The country’s comparative advantage was however 
highest in export of the raw product (thus cocoa beans). Its export performance in processed cocoa (a 
reflection of value addition) was highest during the period 1964-69. This was attributed to significant 
increases in cocoa output during that period amidst collapse in the world price of cocoa beans which 
reduced incentive for exporters to export more of the raw product (beans). Increased processing of 
cocoa beans during that period was to help minimize losses on the part of farmers and to ensure 
continuous production and export of cocoa. The performance of Ghana in its aggregate export of 
cocoa and in cocoa beans export for the periods 1983-92 and 2000-2010 were higher than in the period 
1964-69. Its latter improvement over the earlier period (1964-69) was attributed to initiation of the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983 (which created the right conditions for agricultural 
investments and helped address inefficiencies in marketing and fiscal disciplines), the Agricultural 
Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) between 1987 and 1990 (which helped in strengthening the 
capacity of agricultural research, extension and policy planning), opening up of the domestic market to 
competition through partial liberalization of internal marketing from the early 1990s,  the 
establishment of a price stabilization system (and the relative reduction in farm taxation),  and  
continuous government support to the sector through increased public spending on infrastructure and 
productivity enhancing innovations. 
 
In estimating the magnitude and effects of key economic determinants of cocoa export, production and 
domestic producer price, the results showed a significant position association between export of cocoa 
beans and lagged output, real producer price, real world price to real producer price ratio of cocoa, and 
depreciation in value of the domestic currency (thus increases in exchange rate, GHS /US$ ratio). 
Export of cocoa beans had a significant negative association with increases in real producer price of 
cocoa for Côte d’Ivoire (which stimulates smuggling of cocoa from Ghana into Côte d’Ivoire), lagged 
domestic consumption and lagged export of the raw product (beans) (due to adding-up effect which 
lowers world price of cocoa). Domestic supply (production) of cocoa had significant position 
association with lagged real farm gate price of cocoa, lagged real world price to real producer price 
ratio of cocoa, nominal rate of assistance, depreciation in value of the domestic currency against the 
US$, yield, foreign direct investment and export of cocoa. Nominal producer price in a given year was 
found to be positively driven by increases in nominal producer price in the previous year, nominal 
world price of cocoa in the previous year, nominal rate of assistance, depreciation in value of the 
domestic currency against the US$,  and lagged domestic consumption (demand) of cocoa. It however 
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decreases with increasing global stocks/grindings ratio due to a likely decrease in world price of cocoa 
under such condition. 
 
Improvement in the country’s export performance, anticipated increases in global demand and world 
price of cocoa, wide yield gap of Ghana, positive attitude of farmers in the supply of cocoa due to 
increased government support through COCOBOD (reduced farm taxation, increased farmers share in 
export price, bonuses in cash and in kind) and intensification of competition on the domestic market 
through partial liberalization of internal marketing indicate potential for further improvement in 
Ghana’s performance in cocoa production and exports. However, to realize any further improvement 
in production and exports of both raw and processed cocoa products, measures should be put in place 
to help increase productivity of farmers’ fields (by bridging the wide yield gap), ensure continuous 
government support to farmers and the subsector as a whole, and tighten the loose border of the 
country to help minimize smuggling in times of increasing producer price of cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
APPENDIX 
Figure A.1 Performance of Ghana in Export of cocoa (1961-2010) 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from FAOSTAT 
NB: Cexp –Total cocoa exports; Cbexp –cocoa beans export; PCexport-processed cocoa exports 
 
Figure A.2 Value Addition in Ghana’s cocoa exports (1961-2010) 
 
Source: Author’s construct with data from FAOSTAT 
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Figure A.3 Stability test of estimates (CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares) 
                              Estimates for determinants of cocoa exports 
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Table A.1  Regional Purchases of cocoa by COCOBOD 
 
Year Ashanti 
Region 
Brong-
Ahafo 
Region 
Eastern 
Region 
Central 
Region 
Western 
Region 
Volta 
Region 
Total 
Domestic 
Purchases 
1970 125406 115393 69431 55236 31113 20878 417457 
1971 130434 112076 73805 59813 36153 15348 427629 
1972 148935 116916 76224 62762 47516 10107 462460 
1973 125649 112754 74578 43469 43129 22118 421697 
1974 106977 78502 65617 47707 41338 14489 354630 
1975 109802 81533 73393 50766 52106 14009 381609 
1976 124334 88480 69201 38547 40343 9228 324111 
1978 89619 69541 41289 21553 41968 7369 271339 
1979 86913 50408 50200 25700 45873 5980 265074 
1980 100363 74894 45051 19034 52301 4776 296419 
1981 91537 47598 46632 25563 45148 1496 257974 
1982 70790 49747 36890 22069 43703 1683 224882 
1983 55310 35174 31254 17604 35109 3776 178227 
1984 47059 29685 25504 13818 40161 2659 158886 
1985 44692 28629 28009 18754 51412 1018 172514 
1986 54466 36474 34612 27636 64731 1115 219034 
1987 56870 32643 33399 26912 76038 1903 227765 
1988 49766 28796 29951 19115 58738 1805 188171 
1989 76268 48647 39193 28423 105894 1676 300101 
1990 72124 45126 33296 31208 111513 1785 295052 
1991 60958 42016 32261 26517 128955 2645 293352 
1992 52467 33734 26196 19356 109469 1595 242817 
1993 65353 37014 34608 29587 143288 2273 312123 
1994 47172 30927 25372 21936 128323 924 254654 
1995 64026 37014 33667 20518 153162 1068 309455 
1996 81977 39048 38932 36410 206570 906 403843 
1997 64534 34195 34306 22415 165361 1678 322489 
1998 78909 39898 29468 29468 216955 976 409360 
1999 74390 40212 40503 29653 210545 2060 397363 
2000 82068 39310 41526 31360 240331 2351 436946 
2001 72933 33110 46226 32136 203626 1681 389772 
2002 56983 31354 39348 29992 181865 1021 340563 
2003 82445 45308 51604 39989 276587 913 496846 
2004 121269 69695 68634 55819 419650 1909 736976 
2005 90535 55025 48868 59308 344246 1336 599318 
2006 133026 72766 55871 55497 422223 1075 740458 
2007 95427 65629 51132 43757 357827 761 614532 
2008 124270 66921 55916 62378 369458 838 680781 
2009 110643 61562 63405 60686 413395 951 710642 
2010 116538 60600 55736 57562 359910 595 650941 
Source: COCOBOD (2012) 
http://www.cocobod.gh/weekly_purchases.php 
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